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Cultural Identities and Global Political Economy
from an Anthropological Vantage Point
DAVYDD J. GREENWOOD*
Analyzing the relationships between cultural identities and global
political economy in an anthropologically meaningful way is to step beyond
the normal boundaries of anthropological analysis. The complexity of multi-
layered and dynamic cultural identities, the local and ethnographic focus of
anthropology, and the abstractness of formulations of global political
economy all militate against such an endeavor. Academic discourse finds
comfort in a division of labor that makes such difficult topics disappear.
Yet there are good reasons to address these issues.
The world is now interconnected by a greater multiplicity of rapid
communication technologies than ever before. Gradually, the global
economy is reconfiguring itself into a number of powerful trading blocs.
More ominously, the world is experiencing increased levels of ethnic and
racial conflict and human rights violations. The hope for world peace and
harmony that many expected with the fall of the Iron Curtain has given way
to public despair over Bosnia and Somalia and a sense of fear about the
future of civil strife in countries in every world region. Generations of
political leaders and scholars bent their efforts to the emergence of the
moment in which the arms race would end only to find the post-arms race
world a more dangerous place than they expected. The dangers are not only
international; they now include the world within our borders, as the riots in
Los Angeles, murders of foreign tourists in Miami, and a host of other kinds
of violence demonstrate.
Despite our academic preferences, then, we will continue to be surprised
about the turns that history takes unless we learn to link the cultural, local,
and domestic to the economic, international, and global. The ability to
make predictions and policies that work better may be the difference
between countries and regimes that survive in the future and those that do
not.'
* John S. Knight Professor of International Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853-
7601.
1. Through the historical accidents of my career, I have developed a combined perspective on
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the anthropological study of cultural identities and the failure of social institutions and governments to
develop coherent views and reasonable expectations about the "cultural politics" of international regime
change.
I began my anthropological career examining rural exodus in northern Spain. Because I began
fieldwork in the Spanish Basque Country in 1968, I soon became a student of ethnic conflict and
ethnogenesis with the onset of the present wave of terrorist assassinations in the town next to where I
was working. Since then, studying any and all topics in this region has involved living through and
writing about the process of ethnogenesis and ethnic strife.
In such situations, we all make decisions about causality. In the face of such events, it is not
possible to leave them unexplained or to treat them as intellectual puzzles. Thus, I had to begin my own
search for explanations of the ways such violent, depressing, and ultimately self-destructive situations
could have come about and could be sustained. The study of the history of the Basque area and its
relationship to the central government seemed particularly relevant to me and I worked on this subject
for many years. When I had satisfied my own curiosity, I began trying to develop ways of writing about
this for non-anthropological audiences to make sense of the events and correct what I felt were the most
egregious misinterpretations I kept seeing in print.
After developing my own views on these matters, I spent much effort reading the literature on
ethnicity and ethnic conflict, literature then dominated by political science and sociology. This literature
did not seem to resonate at all with what I had experienced. In presenting the Basque case to such
audiences, I found it surprisingly necessary to emphasize the malleability and dynamism of ethnicity
against both internal and external attempts to envision identity as the enactment of trans-historical cultural
essences. See generally Davydd J. Greenwood, Ethnic Regionalisms in the Spanish Basque Country:
Class and Cultural Conflicts, 5 IBERIAN STUDIES 2:49 (1976); Davydd J. Greenwood, Continuity in
Change: Spanish Basque Ethnicity as an Historical Process, in ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE WESTERN
WORLD , 81 (M. Esmann ed., 1977).
While the intellectual situation has improved measurably since then (See generally IRVIN L. ALLEN,
UNKIND WORDS: ETHNIC LABELING FROM REDSKIN TO WASP (1990); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980s (1986); RICHARD
RODRiGuEZ, DAYS OF OBLIGATION: AN ARGUMENT WITH MY MEXICAN FATHER (1992); KATHY
RUSSELL ET AL., THE COLOR COMPLEX: THE POLITICS OF SKIN COLOR AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS
(1992); and MARY C. WATERS, ETHNIC OPTIONS: CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN AMERICA (1990)),
essentialism regarding ethnic/racial discourse is still a basic element in the public arena. The United
States census has created one of the most powerfully empiricized set of platonistic confusions anyone
could imagine, racializing and "ethnocizing" everything from blood to geographical origin in an attempt
to "enumerate" the people for the redress of social grievance. Minority affairs administrators must
divide the population into neat categories and then we collectively are surprised when these neat
categories do not match individual cases or when their reality becomes something so real that groups are
more than willing to kill each other over them. Thus, despite improvements in the conceptual structures
underlying the study of ethnic identity, the public arena still seems to operate with a pre-Darwinian
vision of cultural differences.
In my own academic career, I have seen the impacts of these essentialisms in many different arenas.
As a co-founder of an inter-college, multi-disciplinary major at Cornell University entitled Biology and
Society, I experienced how our students come to us beautifully equipped with biological/cultural
determinist frameworks that decrease their sensitivity to each other and increase their inability to deal
with cultural differences in other than politically correct enactments of ideologies they neither understand
nor believe. They are also equipped with no sense that their domestic experiences are linked in
meaningful ways to larger events beyond our borders.
More recently, I have profited immensely from a collaborative venture with Carol Greenhouse that
involves comparing the role of legal and administrative regimes in the treatment and construction of
cultural differences. With a group of legal and anthropological specialists from the United States and
Spain, we are at work on a comparative examination of the ways these two countries are attempting to
deal with "difference." We are also trying to untangle the peculiar trajectories of anthropology through
this labyrinth on both sides of the Atlantic. Dominant national visions of cultural difference must
necessarily affect the development of the academic discipline most explicitly concerned with cultural
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I. ELEMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS
A. Relational Relativism
A pivotal concept in my particular view of issues of cultural identity is
"relational relativism."2 It stems from the venerable concept of "cultural
relativism" for which anthropology is famous.3  Stereotypes about
anthropology often center on this concept. According to the stereotype,
anthropologists say that all cultures are different and all differences are
worthy of due consideration. The supposed lesson is that no one can take
cultural relativism, and therefore anthropology, seriously.
While it is possible in all fields to find a piece of writing to support
almost any argument, viewing cultural relativism in this way makes the
mistake of treating it as a theoretical concept. Cultural relativism is both
defensible and important, not as a theoretical view but as a methodology
with significant ethical implications.
differences and similarities, namely anthropology.
Finally, for nine years, I have headed a large center for international studies at Cornell University.
This center brings together language and area studies specialists, faculty interested in development
processes around the world, and many international comparativists. I have also been involved in a
variety of national-level collaborative advocacy efforts for international education that have involved me
in policy-related discussions with people from campuses all over the country and with representatives
of the higher education community in Washington.
I have been struck by a variety of, for me, counter-intuitive facts. Most internationalists lack well-
developed concepts of the cultural dynamics of international social change. Beyond their own
disciplines, many have nothing more than New York Times editorial page levels of knowledge of the
domestic scene. Domestic specialists are equally uninformed about international matters. Foreign
language and area studies specialists often are both insensitive to world context and static in the cultural
frameworks they bring to the analysis of complex problems. International comparativists often have only
the most schematic understandings of the history and cultural dynamics of the various world regions they
compare.
Since the next generation of internationalists is being trained in programs operating within such
frameworks, I now understand that we have a serious "pipeline" problem. We are not going to have a
competent new generation of global thinkers because they are not being trained in existing programs.
Instead, we are reproducing the international/domestic split and the economic-political/cultural split as
if little has happened in the world to challenge such schematizing.
Together these experiences combine to structure my views on the issues of globalization. The
interface between anthropology, ethnic studies, biosocial determinisms, and international studies
administration is an interesting vantage point from which to provoke reflections on the complex,
interrelated processes of globalization.
2. I have coined the term, but not the concept.
3. See MELVILLE HERSKOVITS, CULTURAL RELATIVISM: PERSPECTIVES IN CULTURAL
PLURALISM 14 (1972); ALFRED L. KROEBER & CLYDE L. KLUCKHOHN, CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW
OF CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 344-54 (1952); see generally RATIONALITY (Brian R. Wilson, ed., 1970).
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Shifting to a view of cultural relativism as a methodology, we see that
it imposes certain rules on observers. When confronted with cultural
differences that do not seem to make sense, cultural relativism requires us
to continue the search for understanding by assuming that we have made a
mistake. Anthropologists are trained to assume that differences may only
appear not to make sense because we do not understand them, not because
they are inherently nonsensical. This simple methodological rule of thumb
launched anthropology's era of discovery of complexly structured linguistic,
kinship, political, and religious systems where most other viewers saw either
inferior and primitive behaviors and ideas or noble savages.4 The will to
continue asking questions, and to continue collecting and analyzing
information, receives reinforcement from the cultural relativist argument.
Cultural relativism, of course, has an underlying ethical charge. As a
method, it only makes sense in the context of an ethical commitment to the
notion that all human beings are fully human. They are all worthy of study
for what we can learn about ourselves as a species.
Cultural relativism is not a call to accept behaviors that we find
repugnant. It is a call first to be sure we understand what those behaviors
are about and to be certain that we do not find them repugnant only because
we do not understand them properly. It also imposes a requirement upon
us to understand the context of behaviors that we find repugnant. We are
required to try to understand how what is done could make any sense to the
perpetrators. What we do individually and as political collectivities about
such behaviors is then a matter of our private and public ethical and moral
commitments. Anthropology frees no one from moral obligations.
Relativism also has an intrinsically comparative dimension which is
often lost from view. As important as this notion was in the genesis of
anthropology, its epistemological backdrop was not well developed because
early professional anthropology developed a very strong positivist twist. In
the attempt to overcome the speculative penchant of the so-called "armchair
anthropologists," field anthropologists developed a virulent form of naive
positivism that legitimated their analysis solely because they had gone out
and "gotten the facts" themselves.
In arguing for the value of first-hand experience, these anthropologists
lost sight of something they once clearly knew-that the purpose of the
4. See ROBIN Fox, ENCOUNTER WITH ANTHROPOLOGY 47 (1991); and CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS,
STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 328-32 (1963).
[Vol. 1: 101
CULTURAL IDENTITIES
anthropological enterprise was ultimately to study "them" for what "they"
could teach about "us" here at home and then ultimately about all of "us"
collectively. In other words, these anthropologists forgot that their study of
others was always couched in views about themselves and their own
cultures.
"Relational relativism" reinvokes this intrinsically comparative
dimension of cultural analysis and interpretation. Building on the works of
Goodenough and Wagner, this formulation links to a current spate of textual
studies and constructivist social science.' From this vantage point, all
statements about others are couched in images and discourse about
ourselves. To gain analytical perspective on cultural differences, we must
develop views about how we construct the relationships between us and
them textually and theoretically.
Relational relativism also argues that cultures construct themselves in
relation to their own constructions of "others."6 This second meaning of
the term is particularly germane to globalization because it focuses attention
on the ways all cultural identities center on implicit and explicit
comparisons. When we build these constructions around economic, legal,
and administrative structures-themselves containing many hidden cultural
premises-they can become active forces in conditioning the structure of
conflict and cooperation domestically and internationally.
B. Race, Culture, and Ethnicity
A second pivot is that distinguishing between the concepts of race,
culture, and ethnicity is all but impossible. Race, as a biological concept,
has virtually no meaning for human populations.7 It certainly provides no
basis for classifying the U.S. population. Race, as a cultural concept in the
5. See generally WARD H. GOODENOUGH, DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON IN CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY (1970); and ROY WAGNER, THE INVENTION OF CULTURE (1975). For information
concerning textual studies, see generally WRITING CULTURE: THE POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (James
Clifford & George E. Marcus eds., 1986); GEORGE E. MARCUS & MICHAEL M. J. FISCHER,
ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL CRITIQUE: AN EXPERIMENTAL MOMENT IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES
(1986). On constructivist social science, see generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN
SOCIAL THEORY (1979); BbORN GUSTAVSEN, DIALOGUE AND DEVELOPMENT (1992).
6. See WAGNER, supra note 5, at 4.
7. For extended developments of these arguments, see DAVYDD J. GREENWOOD & WILLIAM A.
STINI, NATURE, CULTURE AND HUMAN HISTORY: A BIo-CULTURAL INTRODUCTION TO ANTHROPOLOGY
at vii (1977).
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United States, has immense cultural significance but no coherent biological
referent. Thus, we cannot make the distinction between race and culture
itself in any intellectually defensible way. Ethnicity, the contemporary
substitute term for race, has even less clear meanings. No one can defend
a mapping of the relationships between ethnicity and race. The attempts to
make a clear distinction between race, ethnicity, and culture turn into
intellectual nightmares. Race, culture, and ethnicity are cultural constructs
with immensely important human consequences.'
C. Constructivism
From the constructivist vantage point, culture is an ongoing historically
and institutionally conditioned process of centering on the human activity
of creating complex worlds of meaning. Understanding how groups make
meanings is part of the study of what the meanings are. Furthermore, we
know that humans make meanings that are "real" enough to die for. We
also know that without the world of made meanings, humans cannot live.9
Here the immediate import of this perspective is that elaborate political
attempts to pin down cultural identities as transhistorical absolutes (an
activity that both those supporting and debunking different ethnic groups
engage in) cannot succeed because of the very character of the phenomenon
in question. The harder anyone works to literalize or stabilize a cultural
identity, the more productive and protean it becomes, or it collapses
completely. l This obviously implies that ill-considered cultural policies
can have protean and uncontrollable consequences.
D. Political Economy
Constructing cultural differences in a polity that rewards difference has
different consequences from engaging in such a process in a polity that
8. For good arguments and references in support of this position, see MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1980s (1986); MARY
C. WATERS, ETHNIC OPTIONS: CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 147 (1990).
9. Clifford Geertz aptly describes man as "an incomplete, an unfinished animal." CLIFFORD
GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 46 (1973).
10. See Davydd J. Greenwood, Ethnic Regionalalisms in the Spanish Basque Country: Class and
Cultural Conflicts, 5 IBERIAN STUDIES 2:49 (1976); and DAVYDD J. GREENWOOD, THE TAMING OF
EVOLUTION: THE PERSISTENCE OF NONEVOLUTIONARY VIEWS IN THE STUDY OF HUMANS 45-46 (1984)
[hereinafter THE TAMING OF EVOLUTION].
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suppresses it. Similarly, constructing cultural differences in an environment
where there is economic growth is a very different process from constructing
cultural differences to compete for diminishing resources. Without a much
more developed understanding of the relationship between political economy
and cultural differences, we collectively must respond to repeated surprises
about the results of our own institutions and interventions in the lives of
others. "
E. Domestic Versus International
One of the most interesting peculiarities of U.S. culture is how hard U.S.
citizens work to retain the intellectually and politically incoherent notion that
domestic cultural differences are fundamentally unlike international cultural
differences. Why would we U.S. citizens try to persuade ourselves that the
differences within our nation are completely different from those between
nations and within other nations?
Perhaps this distinction permits us to deal with "our" differences through
separate policy and moral frameworks, even though such frameworks
themselves are not easily found. Perhaps it permits us to criticize ethnic
cleansing and other genocidal activities beyond our borders, without looking
too closely at the home front where disturbing forms of culturally grounded
oppression occur daily.
Because our views on cultural differences, domestically and
internationally, are incoherent, so too are our policies. We argue for forms
of behavior and set up institutional structures that bedevil us with their
consequences. We conduct the census and produce lists of culturally
different groups, and we estimate the number of illegal aliens in the United
States. Congress wrings its hands and legislates borders that cannot be
maintained, even with guns, all in the interest of domestic politics. At the
same time, international security and development policies are followed that
only worsen these same domestic problems. Together, our approaches
manage to exacerbate ethnic tensions domestically and promote continuing
illegal immigration. At the same time, we also hold fast to our claims of
being the one remaining superpower, the one that stands for democracy and
freedom.
11. Cf. IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE, 86-88, 164-68, 185-86 (1990)
(providing analysis of impact of cultural differences on political activity).
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F. The Need for a "Cultural Politics "
Together, these arguments have two particular foci. First, we must
develop a better understanding of the importance of unintentional cultural
productivity of both national and international administrative and legal
change. Second, relative rates of economic growth play a vital role in
augmenting or modulating conflicts over differences, both domestically and
internationally. Our goal must be to develop policy-relevant frameworks for
anticipating the cultural consequences of regime changes and rates of
economic growth (i.e., genuine "cultural politics"). The alternatives are to
continue to be surprised by cultural turmoils in the world within and outside
our borders (e.g., Los Angeles, Germany, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and to
continue expending money and intellectual effort maintaining a fictional
boundary between domestic and international issues. 2 The net result will
be augmenting internal conflicts while continuing to weaken our
international position through poorly conceived interventions in cultural
conflicts elsewhere. Genuine cultural politics is based on relational
relativism, an analytical vision of the concepts of race and ethnicity, an
understanding of relative economic growth rates, and a recognition of the
cultural productivity of institutional change.
II. ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Memory is inconvenient for a social researcher concerned with ethnicity.
Over the last two decades great "truths" about ethnicity have been forwarded
audaciously, only to be completely swept away by events. When I began
writing about Basque ethnic identity in 1970, the "melting pot" remained the
dominant image for social research on differences in the United States,
despite tremendous unresolved civil rights issues. A few voices even
asserted ethnicity, a primitive form of political movement, was destined to
be supplanted by the sophisticated politics of the welfare state and social
justice. 3
12. Recent events in Haiti show how meaningless the boundaries of political frontiers can be.
The deposed government existed in exile in the United States, and many Haitians have immigrated to
the United States. Now years of diplomacy have resulted in the return of elements of the government
to Haiti, blurring the sharp boundary between what is inside and outside political frontiers.
13. But see, Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism in the First World, in ETHNIc CoNFLICr IN THE
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Ethnicity was described as a survivor from an antiquated political past,
still visible in primitive polities such as Africa (under the name of
"tribalism"). States with strong ethnic conflicts, such as Spain and Ireland,
were viewed as mired in a primitive stage of political development. Along
with these ideas went an unproblematic adherence to the Western canon of
cultural achievements (now often called the works of "dead white men").
These views were not supported by the facts. Ethnicity as a basis of
political mobilization was not melting away in the United States or
anywhere else. The U.S. civil rights movement's instrument of affirmative
action worked strongly against the melting pot notion by seeking to remedy
injustice by affirming oppressed groups' identities in law and administrative
practice. Through this affirmation of their identities as minorities, these
groups received some redress of their grievances, but also hardened the
boundaries between themselves and everyone else. Trying to give this
ethnogenetic activity a positive twist, some denominated the United States
a "salad bowl" rather than a melting pot.
The melting pot was cracking in other ways too. The increasing
numbers and concentrations of Hispanics and Asians in many regions of the
United States became an undeniable cultural presence. This threatened some
people; others welcomed the diversity and dynamism of these groups.
Increasing Black militancy also made its mark. With the melting pot
already in full retreat, the rising feminist movement further subtracted
potentially one-half of the population from commitment to the "canon" of
Western culture as previously understood.
Beyond our borders, the notion that ethnic identities were on the wane
retreated. Belgium, Switzerland, and Canada had worked out carefully
designed systems for managing, rather than eliminating, cultural differences
within their borders. A "Europe of the regions" was being constructed, and
some romantics thought they would see the end of the nation-state and the
rise of a consociation of Europe's "natural" regions as a multiethnic polity.
In the mid-1970s, Spain's democratic constitution embodied ethnic
regionalism and cultural rights in the very structure of the state to a greater
degree than any other constitution written up to that time. With one of the
highest rates of industrial growth in the world between 1965 and 1990,
Spain successfully accommodated political democratization and ethnic
WESTERN WORLD 19, 33-34 (Milton J. Esman ed., 1977) (critique of this view).
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mobilization through economic growth and political astuteness. The
example was largely ignored, since everybody knew from the tourist posters
that "Spain is different!" and, courtesy of Alexander Dumas' nationalistic
slur, that "Africa begins at the Pyrenees."
If previous ideas about ethnic identity and history had not sufficiently
collapsed, the end of the Soviet system showed that ethnic conflict was not
dead in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. If anything,
totalitarianism had only held these conflicts at bay. Totalitarianism has
stabilized the opponents in relation to each other, making them more
powerful and dedicated adversaries than perhaps they were before. Lifting
the yoke produced the predictable explosion, though it surprised many
experts. These regions are immersed in ethnic feuding that is as close to
uncontrolled as we have seen, outside of Los Angeles, in a long time.
The Western democracies completely failed to anticipate and to attempt
to do anything about these conflicts. Busy celebrating our victory over the
"evil empire," we failed to notice that joy in the streets had given way to the
sectional hatreds of decades before. And while we were celebrating peace
in Europe, Los Angeles exploded in a carnival of ethnic violence and hatred.
These images dominated our attention for a week and then disappeared,
overtaken by our fascination with hurricanes, electoral rhetoric, and starving
Somalis (who seem to hate each other for some vague reason that the news
resolutely does not identify as ethnic). Now we are in the midst of a new
presidency. The Clinton campaign raised the expectations of every single
ethnic group, but did so in an economic climate that does not seem to offer
much hope of providing the wealth required to distribute much of anything
equitably.
Equally surprising is that the prolonged experiences of Mexican, Haitian,
Cuban, Jewish, Polish, Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese immigration and
adjustment have not given us a sense of the connection between what we
experience domestically and what is happening internationally. All of these
immigrants arrive at our borders because of a complex mix of economic and
political forces. Where is public policy discussion about why they were
obliged to come here in the first place and about the character of their
identities and connections to their places of origin?
[Vol. 1: 101
CULTURAL IDENTITIES
Robert Reich summed up the dilemma well in the title of the last
chapter of his The Work of Nations,14 "Who is Us?" Reich was referring
to the repeated statements that are made about what "we" in the United
States think, what "we" in the United States should do, and how "'we" in the
United States should defend ourselves against foreign exploitation. Reich
points out that, in this era of global economics and politics, who "we" are
in such statements is by no means clear. If we include the principal
investors in our economic system, then "we" would include the Dutch,
British, and Japanese, among others. If we include Hispanics, Asians, and
African-Americans, it is unclear whether an agenda for national effort can
be forwarded that "we" could all subscribe to collectively, beyond economic
growth for all.
Instead of conceptualizing the global processes which result in the
shifting composition of our minority populations and problems, over the past
thirty years we have built an increasingly complex system of quotas and
other minority-oriented structures in an attempt to redress the very real evils
of injustice within our borders. Yet the very instruments we employ
unintentionally construct and stabilize new ethnic identities as a way of
providing putatively fair and efficient administration. People are forced to
define what group they belong to, even if the boundaries of such groups are
unclear. Individuals involved may not know to which of a variety of
possible groups they should belong or may not want to be anything but who
they were before they had to emigrate. The classification systems grow
more complex each year. There are multiple Hispanic, Asian, and Black
categories. Qualifying as an American Indian or as a native Hawaiian has
been reduced to the calculation of a "blood" fraction, a remarkable piece of
neo-medievalism.
We have created a competitive ethnic market in which groups who most
successfully organize to make claims on resources get the most resources.
To make the claims, they must adapt to the U.S. ethnic minority system
rules. As the abundance of resources changes, so does the intensity of the
competition for them. Not surprisingly, by blindly following this line, we
have ended up with a new set of ethnic conflicts created by the system
originally designed to overcome inequality and inequity.
14. See ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST CENTURY
CAPITALISM 301-15 (1991).
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This group orientation affects all of our organizational systems.
Corporations, educational institutions, and local governments are under legal
obligations to deal with diversity. An index of the problem is the
prominence of the subject, the "management of diversity," in book exhibits
and advertisements for people working in management positions. The
"difference" industry itself has become a highly lucrative one, and yet most
of the material I have seen relies on a common sense distinction between
"difference" (a euphemism for race and gender) and "competitiveness"
(meaning competition with foreign corporations). Apparently, we wish to
consider our domestic problems as cultural and our international problems
as economic. The problems are not only interlinked, but both are
simultaneously cultural and economic, so this is not a very promising
approach.
As this dynamic has gained momentum, people have begun to recognize
the fractures in our national community. For some, this is a loss to be
blamed on someone. For others, the national community was always a lie.
Regardless, each group now has its own canon and accepts no coercive
overall canon of "dead white men" imposed by any other group (except a
dwindling minority of living white men). What is suitable to read, how it
is appropriate to dress or talk, to study history, literature, and social science
have become matters for ethnic vigilance.
Though this seems like an impossible simplification, these contradictions
did not bother most U.S. citizens while the United States was experiencing
sustained and rapid economic growth. This made a larger pie for all.
Redistributing marginal amounts of an ever-larger Gross National Product
(G.N.P.) did not seem particularly problematic to any but diehard racists.
Because of this economic growth, the United States did not experience
severe ethnic conflicts in the sustained way that we do today. In other
countries, totalitarian oppression kept the ethnic fires banked. While racism
and cultural prejudice were visible on the surface of life, the dominant
groups wanted to believe that these phenomena would pass away along with
other features of the old order.
In more recent times, the performance of the U.S. economy has provided
declining resources to distribute via our system of ever more differentiated
cultural rights. This has forced mobilization and social choices that resulted
in increased tension between minorities and dominant groups, and among
minorities themselves.
[Vol. 1: 101
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This situation illustrates some unintended consequences of the pursuit
of social justice through redistributions of rights and goods according to
ethnic criteria. What was a progressive, and perhaps integrating, policy
under positive economic conditions results in the disarticulation of elements
of our civil society when that economic climate changes. We have created
an internal market for cultural groups to compete for crucial resources.
While racism and cultural prejudice may have been pushed below the
surface of public discussion, they seem to have been strengthened by
policies designed to overcome them, particularly as economic competition
becomes more acute.
Another cost of approaching differences in this way has been the
unintended reinforcement of static and legalistic notions of identity.
Because census-defined groups must come forward claiming rights to
resources on the grounds of their transhistorical identity, their oppression,
and their minority status, they are reified by the process set up to provide
remedies for them.
This approach led to some important social gains in the United States,
and I will not deny them. The alternatives to these policies are not yet
clear. Generations of oppression and prejudice yielded nothing to the
ordinary politics of social welfare. Accepting this, however, does not
require us to accept the consequences of our inability to deal with these
issues in other, perhaps more just and humane ways.
We are now in the process of exporting our way of thinking about
cultural differences to deal with such complex international issues as the
Palestinian question, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and contemporary Germany. We
export our peculiar history of dealing with cultural identity by reification,
ideas forged in a particular legal, economic, and ethical context, to locations
where they do not fit. If we take stock of the trajectory of the last thirty
years of this approach in the United States, and place it in global economic
context, we might hesitate to make strong recommendations to other
governments about how they should handle their differences.
III. WE ARE NOT READY FOR THE COMING "NEW" ORDER
In the future, we will experience increased international economic
restructuring in which the United States is an important, but by no means
dominant, player. We already see the increasing impact of ethnic politics
in the international arena. This process will continue. Judging from our ill-
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considered actions so far, it seems likely that we will take an approach to
these conflicts very similar to what we have pursued domestically. We will
probably argue for ethnic rights as a key component in social justice and try
to develop a politics of minoritization within different world regions.
Whether or not we will press for ethnic republics is not now clear, but it is
possible.
We are entering an era in which international organizations are involved
increasingly in administering and adjudicating a wide variety of cultural
claims for rights, goods, and safety. The politics of race and cultural pride
is likely to move beyond national boundaries and involve movements to
"reclaim" identity by redrawing national maps in major ways and by relying
on supranational authorities to control the use of force to permit these
restructurings.
This will necessarily bring with it further movements to manage
diversity internationally. Unless the history lessons from the United States,
Somalia, Angola, South Africa, and the former Yugoslavia are taken more
seriously, we collectively are likely to develop new international regimes
based on hidden notions of race, on rudimentary cultural analysis, and little
understanding of the impact of administrative and legal structures and
processes on identities themselves.
My guess is that we in the United States will be quite unself-conscious
in this process, analogizing from domestic experience (with the
contradictions sanitized away) to the emerging world system, without
appreciating the complex role ethnicity can play for good or ill or our own
implication in ethnogenetic processes through our interventions.
IV. INCREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF UNLIKELY OUTCOMES
Given this pessimistic view of the future, how could we act to improve
our performance? There are a number of lines of action that we could
follow.
A. History Counts
Historically, domestic and international analyses of issues of identity
generally have failed to comprehend the tremendous impact of legal and
administrative institutions on cultural identities. The confidence that culture
is something intrinsic, something real and out there beyond our control is
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built deep into the Western cultural tradition, a tradition that "naturalizes"
cultural differences by attributing them to biological differences or to
environmental differences.1
5
B. Identity is Both Constructed and Real
We now have enough evidence to know that identity is not out there.
It is a complex cultural construction that is profoundly sensitive to
administrative and legal structures and that also carries its history with it.
Identity is real, but is made and remade. Attempts to reconstruct the true
identities of the past create a new, unprecedented, but not randomly
constructed identity of the future. Remaking identities occurs in the context
of previous makings within regime structures that create institutional
constraints and opportunities. A further influence is the structure of
opportunities created by patterns of economic growth. Those who write and
administer the law must come to understand these relationships, or they will
simply reinforce the weaknesses of the system.
C. Economic Cycles Affect Ethnic Relations
While no blind economic determinism regarding identity makes sense,
failure to appreciate the impact of economic situations on identity formation
is a fundamental mistake. Affirmative action as an administrative system
.was implicitly posited on the notion of a continuously growing economy.
Without growth, the costs of affirmative action would have to be distributed
from the well off to the less well off, a far more radical solution than most
of the approaches envisioned. Affirmative action in a low growth or
stagnant economy is a recipe for social conflict and the resurgence of
virulent forms of racial ideologies, on both the right and the left.
A similar dynamic exists in the world system. The rates of economic
growth in relation to the intensity of ethnic claims suggest a non-random
geography of severe ethnic conflicts. A significant amount of conflict is in
the area just behind the former Iron Curtain and in mediating countries like
Germany. How will the already bad relationships between the Japanese and
15. See THE TAMING OF EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 35-36.
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resident Koreans fare if the Japanese economy declines and the South
Korean economy continues to develop?
D. No Longer "Us" and "Them"
U.S. discourse draws a clear line between U.S. domestic problems and
the rest of the world and its international problems. We talk about a
national economic policy and we talk about "our" minorities, yet our
economy is owned by people from many parts of the world. Many of
"them" reside here, managing their assets and employing "us" in the
process. While firms are globalizing, our national debates about
multiculturalism and affirmative action are not. We do not analogize the
conflicts between the Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia with
conflicts between Koreans and Blacks in Los Angeles, or conflicts between
neo-Nazis and Turks in Germany with racial attacks in metropolitan New
York City, and so on.
E. Learning Where Multinational Corporations Fit In
What is the culture of the multinational corporation? How do the
Japanese owners of a U.S. auto manufacturing plant deal with affirmative
action? How does the U.S.-based management of Xerox deal with personnel
policies and Asian marketing strategies of Fuji Xerox? We do not deal with
these questions under the heading of foreign policy or as a dimension of
multiculturalism. Instead we tell managers to take a "diversity pill" in the
form of books, videos, and consultants who teach them how to manage
diversity. We often treat minority hiring and the international operations of
a company as separate areas, just as we treat domestic racial confrontations
and international ethnic conflicts as separate issues. We make no reference
to international diversity, to the national dynamics affecting international
regimes, or to the international regimes affecting national dynamics.
V. CONCLUSION
I suspect we will fail to break our old molds of thought. Vested
interests, created by earlier generations of policy, are very hard to modulate.
The future will bring increasing permeability of international political
boundaries, consolidation of major international trading blocks, and
[Vol. 1: 101
CULTURAL IDENTITIES
increased speed and diversity of communication. Along with these will
come decreasing ability to control the impact of international economic and
political change on domestic civil society. As a result, economic
restructuring brought about by international competition will increasingly be
a problem for our domestic system of difference management. As many
companies fail or are forced to fundamentally readjust, we are likely to have
a decreasing ability to control the confrontations of peoples to whom we
have made conflicting commitments of affirmative action. We will
increasingly hear the voices of the once-privileged middle class whites
whose sense of desperation is already apparent.
We will have a decreasing ability to manage domestic cultural
differences in the light of international economic forces. I sincerely doubt
that we will accept the blame for our problems. This would not be the first
time we have succumbed to the temptation to blame whomever is
conveniently located outside of our boundaries for our problems. In
struggling with our internal problems, we are likely to exacerbate our
international conflicts in such a way that we compromise our ability to deal
with international economic partners who could make some difference to our
declining standard of living.
This process can give rise to contradictory scenarios. For example, we
can look forward to greater integration of the U.S. economy with that of
Latin America, along with increasing conflict between diverse Hispanics in
the United States and conflict over the presence of Hispanic culture in the
United States. We can expect greater U.S. political involvement in
international conflicts that are defined in ethnic terms, while we are unable
to resolve similar conflicts within our borders. Taken together, this means
that we are likely to face a greater inability to separate strategic and ethnic
interests, nationally and internationally, than at any time in our history.
Unless we can rise above these problems, we are unlikely to survive socially
or economically.
To rise above them requires the development of a complex political
economy of cultural difference. This approach must be historical,
multicausal, institutionally specific, economically informed, legally
grounded, and global. These requirements suggest why the task has not yet
been taken up.
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